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This paper proposes a new method to test the Grossman-Helpman model of 
endogenous protection and lobby formation, which does not require data on 
lobby formation or contributions. It identifi es politically organized industries 
using commonly available trade and production data, as well as the model's 
structural parameter estimates. Applied to India, it yields results that are 
qualitatively consistent with the model's predictions and that seem quantita-
tively more plausible than estimates given for the US by alternative methods. 
Our estimates imply that the weight put by the Indian government on con-
tributions by politically organized sectors is a third of the weight it puts on 
(gross) social welfare, well above existing estimates for the United States.
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I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
Drawing on the pioneering work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) 
and Becker (1983) on regulation, one strand of the political-economy litera-
ture that has gained prominence in the area of trade policy views the poli-
cymaking process as an economic exchange between politicians selling po-
licies and lobbies willing to buy them. Grossman and Helpman (1994), who 
contributed to make this approach popular, treated the two-way relationship 
between political support and government favors as a common-agency game 
a la Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b). Compared to previous mode-
ling approaches, Grossman and Helpman's takes the theory of endogenous 
protection closer to 'fi rst-principles' microeconomics and relates equilibrium 
trade policy to measurable variables such as import-penetration ratios, elas-
ticities, and so on.
In spite of the progress made, a number of puzzles remain. First, Ro-
drik (1995) pointed out that, according to the logic of the Grossman-Helpman 
model (henceforth GH), if exporting sectors have larger domestic outputs 
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Rൾඌඎආൾඇ
En este trabajo se propone un nuevo método para testear el modelo de 
Grossman-Helpman sobre protección endógena y la formación de grupos 
de interés (lobbies), que no requiere de datos respecto a la formación de 
los grupos de interés o de sus contribuciones. Identifi ca a las industrias 
políticamente organizadas a partir de datos de producción y comercio 
que son de acceso común, así como las estimaciones de los parámetros 
estructurales del modelo. Aplicado a la India, produce resultados que son 
cualitativamente consistentes con las predicciones del modelo, y que pare-
cen cuantitativamente más plausibles que las estimaciones para los EE.UU 
obtenidas por métodos alternativos. Nuestras estimaciones implican que la 
importancia que el gobierno de la India asigna a las contribuciones de los 
sectores políticamente organizados es una tercera parte de la importancia 
que le asigna al bienestar social (bruto), muy por encima de las estima-
ciones existentes para los Estados Unidos.
Palabras clave:  India, Economía Política, Protección.
Código JEL: F10, F11, F13.
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than import-competing ones –as specialization according to comparative 
advantage would imply —they should also lobby more aggressively, leading 
to more export subsidies than import tariffs, a prediction that is dicult to 
reconcile with evidence.1 A related point is that import-competing sectors 
with larger domestic outputs and hence (ceteris paribus) lower import-pe-
netration ratios should also lobby harder and consequently get higher tariffs 
in equilibrium. However the evidence on this is, at best, mixed. A number 
of empirical studies (e.g. Marvel and Ray 1983, Baldwin 1985, or Lee and 
Swagel 1997) found a positive –instead of negative— relationship between 
import-penetration ratios and the level of protectionin the United States.2 The 
logic behind this result was straightforward: high import-penetration ratios 
proxy for industries where the United States has a comparative disadvantage, 
and those industries tend to lobby harder than others for trade protection.
Goldberg and Maggi (1999, GM henceforth) and Gawande and Band-
yopadhyay (2000, GB henceforth) offered a way out of the puzzle. The star-
ting point was to observe that the GH model predicts a different relationship 
between equilibrium protection and the ratio of domestic output to imports 
for organized sectors vs. unorganized ones. For the former, the relationship is 
positive (hence negative between protection and import penetration, as noted 
above); for the latter, it is the reverse. In order to account for this distinction 
in the estimation, GB and GM interacted the output/imports ratio with a bi-
nary variable equal to one when a sector was politically organized and zero 
otherwise. Regressing the level of protection, proxied by non-tariff barriers 
incidence, on this interaction term (for organized sectors) and on the non-in-
teracted output/imports ratio (for unorganized ones and welfare effects), 
both divided by the elasticity of import demand, yielded parameter estimates 
in accordance with the model's predictions. Both papers also showed that 
GH's parsimonious specication fared well compared to a traditional endoge-
nous-protection regression in which a wide net was cast to catch a variety of 
politically-related effects (employment, industry concentration, etc.).
These studies and more recent ones (Gawande, Sanguinetti and Bo-
hara, 2004, Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu, 2002, and McCalman, 2004) 
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1. For a discussion of the argument and caveats, see Gawande and Krishna (2003). It is worth noting in 
particular that a higher domestic output always raises the return to lobbying (as a given tariff in-
crease is spread over larger quantities). Thus, by Hotelling's lemma, any model in which lobbying 
intensity depends on the price derivative of the prot function will yield this prediction, whether 
or not based on common agency. 
2.  It should be noted however that the relationship between import penetration and endogenous 
protection turned out to be less clearcut when the endogeneity of imports was explicitly taken into 
account, as in Ray (1981) or Trefl er (1993).
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provide evidence in favor of the common-agency approach to endogenous 
trade policy. However they have also raised, as a by-product, a second 
puzzle. Structural estimation yields more information than just the validation 
of qualitative relationships: if the model is to be taken seriously, its estima-
tion should also yield quantitatively plausible estimates of key parameters. In 
particular, the weight given to welfare in the government's objective function 
(parameter “a” in GH's formulation) can be retrieved algebraically from re-
gression estimates. This weight matters not just as a measure of government 
preferences but also –perhaps more importantly— as a factor of proportio-
nality between contributions and the welfare distortions generated by tariffs. 
As noted by GB, in a stripped-down setting without general equilibrium 
interaction, the common agency framework degenerates into a collection 
of “parallel” principal-agent relationships in which lobbies compensate the 
government for the welfare distortions implied by the tariffs they are asking 
for. The rate of conversion between welfare distortions and monetary contri-
butions is then a. Values of a above one, for instance, imply that lobbies must 
contribute multiples of the welfare distortions their protectionist demands 
imply. The values of a estimated in the papers mentioned above were, from 
this perspective, very high,3 “enough”, in Gawande and Krishna’s terms, “to 
cast doubt on the value of viewing trade policy determination through this 
political economy lens” (Gawande and Krishna 2003, p. 20).
One way out of the puzzle was recently suggested by Damania and 
Frederiksson (2007), who extended GH to a multi-agent multi-principal mo-
del in which trade-policy decisions are made by consensus among a number 
of government agencies. Each of these agencies is targeted for contributions 
by lobbies, but each has a probability γ of being replaced before having 
had a chance to implement the promised policy. “Replacements” are fresh 
politicians assumed initially impervious to lobbying. In such a setting, the 
parameter measured empirically is a function of the true weight of welfare 
in the agents' objective function and, inter alia (the model is richer than the 
description given here) of the probability of early replacement of any go-
vernment agent. As it turns out, the true a is below the observed one, and 
simulations suggest that it may easily be so by a wide margin.
Although this approach provides a nice answer to the “high-a puzzle”, 
it still implies that the ratio of equilibrium contributions to implied welfare 
distortions is proportional, by a factor 1–γ (where γ is the probability of any 
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3.  Parameter estimates from Goldberg and Maggi's (1999) basic specication imply values of  a lying 
between 51.93 and 70.43. Other estimates of a range from 43:41 (McCalman, 2004) to somewhere 
between 76 and 104 (Mitra et al., 2002) to 3175 (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000).
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trade-policy offi cial being replaced) to the measured a (what Damania and 
Frederiksson call ae).4 Thus, as long as the estimated value of a is high, part 
of the empirical puzzle (high implied contributions) remains, even though 
the measured a may not truly refl ect the weight on welfare in the government's 
objective function.
An additional issue has to do with the identication of sectors organized 
into active trade-policy lobbies. GB and GM relied on outside information, 
looking at Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions and choosing a 
cutoff above which they considered industries as organized. There are two 
problems with this. First, PAC contributions are a noisy signal of trade-related 
infl uence activities. On one hand, they accounted for only half the cam-
paign contributions in the US 1997-98 electoral cycle, the other half being 
so-called “soft money” (contributed to national parties rather than individual 
lawmakers). Infl uence activities take other forms as well: the turnover of 
lobbying fi rms registered under the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act was $1.46 
billion in the same electoral cycle (CRP 2001). On the other hand, PAC con-
tributions are not necessarily trade-related as lobbies also try to infl uence 
domestic policies. Thus, PAC contributions both understate and overstate trade- 
related infl uence activities and this may affect the ranking of sectors and 
hence the cutoff between organized and unorganized ones. Because the dis-
tinction between organized and unorganized sectors is so crucial empirically, 
this is a potential problem. Second and perhaps more importantly, relying on 
PAC contribution data precludes using the method in countries other than the 
US where no data is available on political contributions. Confi ned to the US, 
tests of the theory would rapidly hit diminishing returns (in addition, serious 
doubts have recently been raised by Imai et al. (2005) about the adequacy of 
NTB-based tests; but performing tests outside of the US requires new methods.
Several such methods have been proposed recently. Gawande, San-
guinetti and Bohara (2004) analyzing Mercosur's trade protection, assume 
that industries in which imports are above the sample mean are politically 
organized into protectionist lobbies. Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) 
analyzing Turkey's trade protection, make use of membership data from 
the Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen Association to determine which 
sectors are organized. The authors then statistically validate their choice of 
organized sectors using discriminant analysis methods. McCalman (2004) 
analyzes tariff changes in Australia between the late sixties and early nineties and 
uses the fact that tariff changes required Tariff Board inquiries, ninety percent of 
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4.  We are grateful to Per Fredriksson for a helpful explanation on this.
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which were undertaken at industry's initiative. He thus takes the initiation of a 
Tariff Board inquiry as evidence of an industry's political organization.
We propose an alternative method which, instead of drawing on out-
side information, uses information generated by the tariff data itself and can 
thus, in principle, be applied to any setting. While being close in spirit to the 
recent literature, it differs in two key respects. First, as mentioned, we endo-
genously derive from the model a classiffi cation of industries into organized 
vs. unorganized ones through an iterative procedure. In the fi rst stage, we 
estimate a standard GH equation without dierentiating between organized 
and unorganized sectors. This regression determines endogenous tariffs as 
functions of, inter alia, import penetration ratios. In the second stage, we 
use the fi rst equation's residuals to rank industries, those with high residuals 
being, in some sense, more likely to be organized than others. On the basis of this 
ranking, we then set an arbitrary cutoff value above which industries are consi-
dered to be organized. Finally, we run a grid search over different cutoff values.
Second, we refi ne on GB's modeling of input-output linkages. Trea-
ting those linkages explicitly is important both conceptually and empirically. 
Conceptually, the gist of the common-agency approach is that good policies 
(small departures from free trade in a trade-policy context) result not just 
from governments being impervious to infl uence activities, but also from 
the balance of confl icting lobbying pressures. Counter-lobbying against pro-
tection of an industry by its down-stream users is one such countervailing 
force and is likely to be more effective when they are industrial users rather 
than fi nal ones. Recognizing this leads to sharper predictions and hence more 
powerful tests of the theory. We depart from GB in our use of input-output 
data to determine jointly the protection of fi nal and intermediate goods.5 We 
also draw from Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2003) to include the effect of 
duty-drawbacks on lobbying incentives.
The methodology is applied to India, a country that has, for a variety 
of reasons, enjoyed a large degree of independence in the denition of its 
trade policy. In addition, trade protection in India largely takes the form of 
tariffs, so it is not subject to the same critique of the power of empirical tests 
of the GH model on US data, where non-tariff barriers are relatively more 
important.6
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5.  A similar approach is followed by Cadot et al. (2004) and Gawande and Krishna (2005) who 
incorporate counter-lobbying by downstream users of intermediate inputs.
6.  According to estimates by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009), non-tariff barriers explain 75 percent 
of the trade restrictiveness in the United States, but less than 20 percent in India. 
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The empirical results provide strong evidence in favor of the common- 
agency approach and are encouraging for further applications of the method. 
Direct producer lobbying, counterlobbying by users of intermediate inputs, 
as well as the counter-lobbying dilution effect introduced by tariff exemption 
schemes for exporters are all identifi ed in the data. Based on parameter 
estimates, the weight given to political contributions is 31 percent higher 
than the weight granted to (other elements of) social welfare, well above the 
problematic estimates found in earlier studies, where governments seemed to 
be close to maximizing social welfare. Out of 80 ISIC sectors, we identify13 
as organized for trade policy purposes.
II. Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ൺඇൽ අඈൻൻඒංඇ඀: A ൻൺඌංർ ൿඋൺආൾඐඈඋ඄
In this section, we present the basic model guiding our empirical 
estimation exercise. One can think of the setup as similar to the one in Mitra 
(1999), where owners of speciffi c factors in import-competing industries fi rst 
decide whether to organize into lobbies or not, after which trade policy is 
determined by a Grossman-Helpman (1994) common-agency game.7 Here 
we focus on the second stage (i.e., trade policy determination) taking the 
decision to politically organize as given. 
Consider a small open economy with n + 1 tradable sectors, in which 
good zero serves as numeraire. Individuals have different endowments but 
identical tastes represented by a utility function:
(1)
where c0 is consumption of the numéraire good, cj is the consumption 
of non-numeraire good j, and u satisfi es the usual properties.
All goods produced in the economy are potential inputs in other sectors, 
and all industries are perfectly competitive. In all sectors j =1 ,..., n except 
the numeraire, technology is Leontief between intermediate consumptions 
and value added; thus, value added is nested in the Leontief production func-
tion and is created using a specic factor κj (“capital”) and a mobile factor j 
(“labor”) under a general constant-returns to scale technology fj . Let aij be 
31
7. We will use indifferently the terms “common agency” and “menu auction” to describe Gross-
man-Helpman's application to trade policy of the theoretical framework developed by Bernheim 
and Whinston (1986a, b). For our purposes, the two are mathematically equivalent.
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the requirement of good i necessary to produce one unit of good j, and let xij 
be sector j's demand for good i as an intermediate input;
(2)
We will henceforth omit κj as an argument of production and profi t 
functions. The numeraire good is produced using labor only under constant 
returns to scale, so that the wage rate w is fi xed.
Let p *j  be good j’s world price and tj an ad-valorem import tariff 
(subsidy if it is negative); good j’s domestic price is thus pj = p *j (1 + tj). 
Let vj (t) be the indirect utility function of the owners of specic capital in 
sector j, where t is the n-dimensional vector of tariffs on imported goods 
(all goods are tradeable). Let αj be the share of sector j’s shareowners in 
the population. Under quasilinear preferences, vj is the sum of income and 
consumer surplus. Income is the sum of prots  πj plus αj times economywide 
tariff revenue T (t). Consumer surplus is j times economywide consumer 
surplus S(t). Thus,
Let L be the set of politically organized industries (determined endo-
genously in the fi rst stage) and Ij an indicator function equal to one when j 
∈ L and zero otherwise. Lobbies representing the owners of specic capital in 
those industries bid simultaneously for protection with ‛truthful’ contribution 
schedules Cj (t) = max : {0; vj (t)  – bj} for some nonnegative constant bj. 
Faced with such contributions, the government chooses best-response tariffs 
that maximize
(3)
where W(p) is social welfare and a is the weight of social welfare. 
Therefore tariffs satisfy the FOC:
(4)
After tedious but straightforward derivation detailed in the mathema-
tical appendix, solving (4) for                                     , the fi rst order condition 
becomes: 
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vj(t)= πj(t)+ αjT (t)+ αjS(t)
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8.  For a review of the extensive Indian reforms in the early 1990s, see Pursell (1996) or Srinivasan (2001). 
As an indication, the average tariff in 1990-1991 was around 128 percent, with an import-weighted 
average of 87 percent.
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where                                                           is the output of sector j over 
imports of sector i, εi is the import demand elasticity in sector i and λj is the 
share of sector j output that is exported. As in GB and GM, the fi rst term in 
(5) shows that equilibrium tariffs are an increasing function of the output/import 
ratio for politically organized sectors (and the reverse for unorganized ones). 
The second term reduces tariffs due to counter-lobbying pressure by organized 
downstream sectors. However, due to the duty drawback scheme, this counter- 
lobbying effect is weaker the larger is the exported share of the downstream 
sector's output.
III. Iඇൽංൺ'ඌ Tඋൺൽൾ Pඈඅංർඒ
India is an interesting case study for several reasons. First, it is un-
doubtedly one of the countries in the world with the highest trade barriers. 
Indeed, in his review of the World Trade Organization's Trade Policy Review 
of India in 1998, Panagariya (1999) warned that “a reader unfamiliar with 
India's past is bound to wonder how a trade-policy regime such as the one about 
to be described can be characterized as having undergone serious reforms”.8 
The average tariff was around 35 percent in 1997-1998. This compares badly 
with the average for developing countries in the late 1990s (around 13 percent 
overall and for manufacturing). 
More importantly given the efforts in this paper to model input-output 
linkages, signiffi cant tariff escalation is present in India's tariff structure. 
Tariffs on unprocessed goods average 25 percent whereas fully processed 
goods average 37 percent. As it has been shown in the previous section, this 
can be explained by downstream counter-lobbying on upstream tariffs.
The tariff structure is further complicated by numerous and spreading 
exemptions (Panagariya, 1999 and Srinivasan, 2001), including those tar-
geting exporters, such as the Duty Draw-back scheme which compensates 
exporters for tariffs paid on imported inputs upon export of the fi nished 
product; the Duty Exemption scheme, which offers large exporters duty 
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exemption on imported inputs prior to export of the fi nished product; and 
the Export Promotion Capital Goods scheme, which provides exporters with 
access to foreign capital goods at reduced tariff rates.9 Use of these exporter 
exemptions schemes has tended to grow signicantly since the early 1990s 
(Panagariya, 1999). These schemes will tend to dilute the counter-lobbying 
by downstream users of intermediate goods as shown in the previous section.
IV. Eආඉංඋංർൺඅ ආൾඍඁඈൽඈඅඈ඀ඒ
As explained in the introduction, we base the estimation of equilibrium 
import tariffs on a careful distinction between organized and unorganized 
sectors, using an approach that derives the classifi cation of sectors into organized 
vs. unorganized ones from the data and the model itself. Before describing 
the empirical methodology, let us rewrite equation (5) as:
(6)
The advantage of rewriting (5) as (6) is twofold. First, sending zi and 
εi to the left-hand side (LHS) eliminates the need to correct for measurement 
errors in εi and to instrument for zi and εi which are both potentially endo-
genous. Second, the theoretical equation to be estimated now has a constant, 
which facilitates the interpretation of some results and avoids biasing the 
estimates in the presence of missing variables.
IV.1. Estimating structural parameters
The estimation problem is one of estimating simultaneously the para-
meters of a switching-regression model and the true classication of observa-
tions into two possible regimes: organized vs. unorganized, recognizing that 
(i) the true classication is unknown and (ii) it results from choices that are en-
dogenous to the equilibrium level of protection. To deal with such problems, 
several approaches are possible, including the EM algorithm (McLachlan 
and Krishnan 1997) and grid-search procedures (Goldfeld and Quandt 1973), 
all suitably adapted to deal with the endogeneity problem and therefore all 
complex. We adopt a grid-search procedure in which the variable serving 
to defi ne the cutoff between the two regimes is generated as part of the es-
timation procedure. This classication procedure is justiffi ed in Appendix 2. 
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9.  For a complete description of these sechemes, see Table III.4 in WTO (1998).
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LI | N° 1 | (2013) | ඉඉ. 25-52 | ISSN 0034-8066
35Eඇൽඈ඀ൾඇඈඎඌ Tൺඋංൿൿඌ ංඇ ൺ Cඈආආඈඇ-A඀ൾඇർඒ Mඈൽൾඅ:A Nൾඐ Eආඉංඋංർൺඅ...
10.  Note that setting all initial Ii to one yields the same equation; only the initial parameters inter-
pretation would be different.
11. For the same reason instrumenting for I using a polynomial and non-linear method to estimate the 
tariff equation is not possible as we would run out of degrees of freedom. A panel dataset would 
allow for this alternative method.
otherwise. 
if
As argued in the introduction, our procedure has the advantage of bypassing 
the use of out-of-model proxies such as PAC contributions which can bias 
classifi cations and parameter estimates. It has four steps. 
Step 1. A stochastic version of (6) is estimated where all Ii are set 
equal to zero (no information):10
(7)
where μi is the error term. Although the algebra implies that 
γ1 = − γ0 = − γ2 = αL/(a + αL) > 0; no constraint is imposed at this stage 
other than  Ii = 0 ∀i.
Step 2. Residuals are retrieved from the estimation of (7) and their 
magnitude is taken to indicate how successful each lobby was in obtaining 
protection. Let σμ be the standard deviation of the error term. Let also ρ be a 
parameter, at this stage assigned an arbitrary value. The political-organization 
variable Ii is determined by the following rule:
(8)
 
In words, whenever the error term for observation i is algebraically 
higher than ρ times the standard deviation, sector i is deemed organized and 
Ii is set equal to one.
Step 3. The vector I = (I1, ..., In) constructed according to (8) is in-
troduced into a stochastic, unconstrained version of (6) which is then re-run. 
Because Ii appears in (6)'s fi rst term while other elements of I (the Ij) appear 
in its third term, all terms involving counter-lobbying (terms in aij) need to be 
recalculated, since in equilibrium they depend on whether sectors j = 1, ..., n
are organized or not.11 In order to facilitate the interpretation of parameter 
estimates, we separate them from terms involving counter-lobbying dilution 
through duty drawbacks (terms involving aij and λj). 
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Before introducing constraints on the parameters, the equation to be 
estimated is then:
(9)
The algebra implies that β2 = αL /(a + αL) = −β0 =  −β3 > 0 and 
β5 = β1 = −β4 = 1/ (a + αL)> 0. Thus, the estimation of (9) yields five estima-
ted coefficients (βs) for only two unknown structural parameters: a and αL. 
In order to later be able to retrieve these, we also proceed with the 
estimation of a constrained version of (9) using again (7) as a first step:
(10)
where β0 = −αL /(a + αL) < 0  and  β1 = 1 /(a + αL) > 0.
Note that selectivity is involved in the classifi cation of industries into 
organized vs. unorganized ones because the decision to organize is endoge-
nous to the level of protection that can be obtained in equilibrium (see Mitra 
1999 for a theoretical treatment and GB 2000 for empirical implications). 
Taking the selectivity into account calls for a treatment-effect estimation 
procedure.We use the two-step estimator described in Maddala (1983) which 
consists of augmenting regression (9) or (10) –whichever is used― with the 
estimated hazard rate retrieved from an auxiliary probit regression of the 
binary variable I (itself retrieved from Step 2) on a set of instruments including 
the shares of capital and skilled labor in value added as well as the number of 
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11.  For the same reason instrumenting for I using a polynomial and non-linear method to estimate 
the tariff equation is not possible as we would run out of degrees of freedom. A panel dataset 
would allow for this alternative method. 
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fi rms in each sector. This procedure yields consistent estimates of regression 
coeffi cients and standard errors.12
Step 4. A grid search is used to fi nd the ρ that minimizes the sum of 
squared residuals. The fi nal I* vector can then be retrieved.
Together, these four steps provide a theoretically consistent method 
to determine which sectors are politically organized to infl uence trade policy 
when data on political contributions is not available. The model's structural 
parameters can then be algebraically retrieved from the estimates of β0 and 
β1. Solving for a and αL gives
(11)
(12)
V. Eආඉංඋංർൺඅ Rൾඌඎඅඍඌ
The construction of variables is described in detail in Table 1. It 
provides constrained regression estimates with and without input-output co-
effi cients (fi rst and second columns respectively) as well as unconstrained 
ones (third column). Constrained regression estimates are for ρ = 0,3 with 
input-output coeffi cients. Both parameter estimates have the expected sign 
and      is signicant at the 1% level, a remarkably sharp signal for such a small 
sample (80 observations) and given the noisiness of input-output coeffi cients.
Using (11)-(12) and constrained regression estimates, we retrieved nu-
merical values for a and αL. The implied estimate for a, the weight of welfare 
in the government's objective function, is a
̭ 
 = 3.09. A test of the non-linear 
constraint (11) suggest that a
̭ 
  is signicantly different from zero at the one percent 
level. This estimate is well below estimates previously found for the United 
States, which were in the hundreds or even thousands, and arguably more plau-
sible, although still too high in the sense that it implies that lobbies must con-
tribute multiples of the monetary value of the distortions their demands imply.
The estimate for αL, the share of the population employed in industries 
organized politically for trade-related purposes, is  α
̭
  L   =0.036 / 0.310 = 0.12. 
Note that whereas the denominator of this expression (equal to   β
̭
 L ) is estimated 
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12. Whether this type of procedure is really useful on a small sample like ours is debatable. As it turns 
out, the hazard rate's coeffi cient in the augmented regression was signicant in all specications, 
suggesting that the selectivity bias ought not to be ignored.
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precisely, its t-statistic being 2.99, its numerator is not signicantly different 
from zero. This estimate of the organized share of the population, which is 
thus itself not signicantly different from zero (a test of the non-linear cons-
traint (12) fails to reject the hypothesis that αL is zero), is, in our view, more 
plausible than those found previously, some of which were as high as 70% 
on the basis of US data.
Results for the constrained regression without input-output linkages 
(i.e. without counter-lobbying by downstream users) are shown in the second 
Constrained 
with IO 
linkages
Constrained
without IO 
linkages.
Unconstrained
Net lobbying (β1) 0.310*** 
(2.99)
Net welfare (β0) -0.036
(1.15)
Lobbying (β1) 0.311*** 0.275*** 
(2.63) (3.13)
Welfare (β0) 0.003
(0.42)
Int. Sales on welfare (β2) 0.001
(0.05)
Duty Dr. on welfare (β3) 0.189
(1.378)
Counter-lobbying (β4) -0.334* 
(1.69)
Duty Dr. on lobbying 
(β5)
0.422
(1.21)
Hazard rate -0.104* -0.107* -0.088*
(1.82) (1.66) (1.78)
Implied ab 3.09 3.23
Implied αc 0.12 -0.01
R2 adjusted 0.56 0.51 0.60
Observations 80 80 80
# org. sectors 13 11 13
ρ parameter 0.3 0.4 0.3
Table 1
Explaining India's tariffsa
aEstimated using the algorithm described in section 4.1.  
bSee equation (11).  
cSee equation (12).
*** stands for statistical signicance at the 1% level;
** for signifi cance at the 5% level, and * for signicance at the 10% level.
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column of Table 1 and are not very different from those of the fi rst column. 
Thus, the inclusion of input-output linkages is not what drives the sharp re-
duction in the estimated value of a that we report here.
The results of the unconstrained regression suggest that producer 
lobbying (Ii) has a positive and statistically signicant infl uence (at the 1% le-
vel) on tariffs. Similarly, counter-lobbying by organized downstream sectors 
(Σj Ij aij yj/yi) tends to reduce tariffs as predicted by the model and is also 
statistically signifi cant at the 10% level. The counter-lobbying dilution effect 
(Σj Ijλjaijyj/yi) introduced by duty drawback schemes granted to exporters 
has the right sign, but it is not statistically signicant. The non-lobbying ter-
ms are all statistically insignifi cant. This suggest that we may be asking too 
much information from a relatively small and noisy sample, which implies 
that introducing the theoretically valid constraints makes empirical sense.
Table 2 provides a list of organized and unorganized sectors. The 
number of organized sectors is low (13 out of 80). The identity of organized 
vs. unorganized sectors makes sense. Sectors derived as unorganized in India 
include those which are typically organized for protectionist lobbying in in-
dustrial countries: practically all the textile and clothing industry, footwear, 
furniture, and steel. Thus, broadly speaking, the predicted pattern of politi-
cal organization appears consistent with the notion that “losers” (sectors in 
which a country has a comparative disadvantage) are more likely to organize 
themselves for political action than “winners”.
VI. Rඈൻඎඌඍඇൾඌඌ
VI.1 Classication of industries
One key selling point of the method proposed in this paper is its abi-
lity to bypass the usual problem of identifying which sectors are organized, 
because identifi cation is obtained as a result of the estimation itself. It is therefore 
important to assess how stable are the method's predictions as to who is or-
ganized and who is not. In order to shed some light on this, we performed 
Monte Carlo experiments on simulated data in order to generate a sampling 
distribution for the vector of organized sectors. Instead of starting from a 
purely arbitrary data set, we used Gawande and Bandyopadhyay's US data 
and constructed an initial vector of organized sectors using our method.13 We 
then generated a thousand alternative data sets by adding a white-noise term 
13.  We are grateful to them for providing us the data.
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Unorganized Sectors Organized Sectors
3111 Meat prep. 3513 Synthetic resins 3212 Made-up textile goods
3112 Dairy prod. 3521 Paints 3233 Leather ex. Footwear
3113 Canned fruit and veg. 3522 Drugs and medec. 3511 Chemicals
3114 Canned fi sh and crust 3523 Soap and cleaning 3530 Petroleum refi neries
3115 Veg and an. oils fats 3529 Chemical prod. Nec. 3720 Non-ferrous metal.
3116 Grain mill prod. 3540 Misc of petroleum 3823 Metal and wood machinery
3117 Bakery prod. 3551 Tyre and tube indus. 3824 Special ind. Machinery
3118 Sugar refi neries 3559 Rubber prod. n.e.c. 3825 Off. and comput. eq.
3119 Cocoa confect. 3560 Plastic prod. n.e.c. 3829 Equip. except. electr.
3121 Food prod. n.e.c. 3610 ”Pottery, china” 3832 Radio, TV, and comm.
3122 Prep. Animal feeds 3620 Glass 3851 Scientifi c equipment
3131 Alchoholic bev. 3691 Structural clay 3852 Optical goods
3132 Wine industries 3692 Cement, lime 3901 Jewellery
3133 Malt liquors and malt 3699 Non-metallic nec
3134 Soft drinks 3710 Iron and steel
3140 Tobacco manuf. 3811 Cutlery, hand-tools
3211 Spinning textiles 3812 Metal Furniture
3213 Knitting mills 3813 Metal Products
3214 Manuf. Carpets and rugs 3819 Metal prod. n.e.c.
3215 Cordage, rope 3821 Engines
3219 Textiles nec 3822 Agricul. Machinery
3220 Apparel, ex. Footwear 3831 Electr. ind. mach.
3231 Tanneries and leather 3833 Electrical appliances
3232 Fur dressinganddyeing 3839 Electrical eq.  Nec
3240 Footwear 3841 Ship building
3311 Sawmill sandwood mills 3842 Railroad equipment
3312 Wooden and c. cont. 3843 Motor vehicles
3319 Wood and c. prod. n.e.c. 3844 Motorcyc. and bic.
3320 Furnitures 3845 Manuf. of aircraft
3411 Paper and Paper board 3849 Transport equip. n.e.c.
3412 Paper boxes 3853 Watches and clocks
3419 Pulp and paper 3902 Musical inst.
3420 Printing and publ. 3903 Sporting goods
3512 Fertilizers and pest. 3909 Manuf. prod. n.e.c.
Table 2
Estimated organization dummy(I) a
aThese are the estimated organized sectors for trade purposes using the four steps of our 
empirical methodology described in section 4.
to the endogenous variable and, each time, re-estimating the model using our 
procedure. Finally, we calculated sample statistics for the thousand vectors 
of the predicted organizational dummy variable. Formally, our procedure ran 
as follows.
The fi rst step consisted in adding a shock to the dependent variable. 
The shock was a normally-distributed random variable with mean zero and 
a standard error equal to 20% of the sample estimate of the dependent varia-
ble's standard error. This initial step, however, was less than straightforward 
given that the dependent variable used by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(ni / (1 + ni) where ni is the coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers for sector i) 
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14. Formally, consider two latent variables y * N (μ, σ2) and z * = y * + ε where ε  N (με, σε2). 
Let  μz and σz2 denote the mean and variance of z. Suppose that we observe
and similarly for z. That is, both are censored at zero. Finally let  λ = φ/Φ be the inverse Mills 
ratio. Then it can be shown that E (y) = ( μ+λσ) Φ(μ/σ) and that 
 
This is the correction we used. Right-censoring was ignored as it concerned only three observa-
tions out of 242.
15.  We used Smith and Blundell's procedure rather than the one we used for India's tariffs (a variant 
of Heckman's selection model) because the latter is unsuitable to censored data.
16.  See Mitra et al. (2006) for a similar approach.
is left- and right-censored (at zero and one half respectively). It can be shown 
(see e.g. Greene, 1997) that adding white noise to a censored variable raises 
its mean. We corrected for this using a fi rst-order approach.14 In addition, ad-
ding white noise to censored values does not make much sense, so instead we 
used the predicted value of the dependent variable for censored observations, 
added noise to this predicted value, and then censored when appropriate.
The next step was to apply our estimation method using a procedure 
based on Smith and Blundell's exogeneity test (Smith and Blundell 1986).15 
That is, in the fi rst step we regressed the organizational dummy Ii on all 
the instruments we obtained from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, including 
squared and interaction terms (see their paper for details). In the second step, 
residuals from this auxiliary regression were used as a RHS variable in the 
usual regression with non-tariff barriers as the dependent variable (we actually 
divided the dependent variable by zi/ei in order to eliminate the latter from 
the RHS and thus avoid simultaneity and measurement-error issues).16 The 
second equation was estimated by Tobit to take care of the censoring. Next, 
we retrieved the residuals from this second regression and used them to clas-
sify sectors as organized or not based on an arbitrary cutoff value, and then 
searched for the cutoff value minimizing the sum of squared errors. Finally, 
we recorded the predicted value Îi of Ii: This procedure was then replicated 
a thousand times. The results of this experiment are quite striking. Let Î0 = 
(I1, ..., In)' be the vector of dummy variables marking the organization of 
sectors i =1 ,..., n in the initial data set, k =1 ,..., 1000 index replications, 
and Îk the predicted value of  Î0 at replication k. Let also ρk =corr (Îk, Î0).The 
average value of ρk across the thousand replications was   = 0.745 (0.711 
without the fi rst-order correction, labeled FOC). Calling “type-I errors” sec-
tors for which Îk = 1 whereas I
 ̭ 
ik = 0 and vice-versa for type-II, the percen-
tage of type-I errors was 2.15% and that of type-II errors 0.93% (3.67% and 
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0.76% respectively without the fi rst-order correction). The total percentage 
of “wrong” predictions was thus 3.07% with the fi rst-order correction and 
4.42% without. The distribution of optimal cutoff values was centered on 1.4 
(1.5 without the FOC), for a “true” (initial) value of 1.5. Finally, the average 
error on the estimated value of a was 4.4% (13.88% without the FOC).
6.2 Consistency across estimators
As a further check, we estimated the specication without IO linkages 
using three dierent estimators: our four-step grid search, a standard maxi-
mum-likelihood grid-search estimator (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1958),17 and a 
maximum likelihood EM algorithm. Results are shown in Table 3.
Grid Search
4 steps
Grid Search
ML
EM
algorithm
Lobbying (β1) 0.311*** 0.169*** 0.287*** 
(2.63) (2.46) (2.31)
Welfare (β0) 0.003 0.004*** 0.009***
(0.42) (40.4) (3.70)
Implied ab 3.23 5.78 3.37
Implied αc -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
Observations 80 80 80
# org. sectors 11 19 11
Table 3
Explaining India's taris (without IO linkages)
using different estimators
*** stands for statistical signicance at the 1% level; ** for signicance at the 
5% level, and * for signicance at the 10% level.
bSee equation (11).
cSee equation (12).
The three estimation methods provide estimates of β1 that do not 
differ signicantly from each other, and the resulting three estimates of a all lie 
within a reasonable range. Results using our four-steps grid search approach 
are particularly close to those obtained using the EM algorithm.
It would also have been interesting to estimate the specication with IO 
linkages using the ML grid search and EM algorithm, but we do not believe 
17. See also Hotchkiss (1991) for a recent application.
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that this is feasible, because when IO linkages are introduced the problem is 
no longer just one of unkown sample split (between organized and not-orga-
nized sectors), but of recalculating some of the regressors at each step on the 
basis of provisional sample-split estimates. Nevertheless, the fact that our 
four-step grid search —which circumvents this problem— yields results fair-
ly similar to those obtained from two standard estimators gives us confi dence 
in its robustness and consistency.
VII. Cඈඇർඅඎൽංඇ඀ Rൾආൺඋ඄ඌ
The objective of this paper was to provide an empirical method to 
identify jointly, on the basis of the Grossman-Helpman approach, what are 
the driving forces behind observed patterns of trade protection and which 
sectors fi nd it profi table to organize themselves for trade policy infl uence.
This endeavour is important for two reasons. First, outside of the United 
States, no information is available on the activity of special-interest groups and 
on their degree of organization. Taking Grossman-Helpman outside of the US, 
in particular to emerging countries where infl uence via monetary contributions 
is most likely to be prevalent, requires an indirect method such as ours. Second, 
our approach bypasses the problem of disentangling the share of contributions 
directed at trade-policy infl uence from the share directed at domestic policies.
Beyond methodological issues, our approach provides further vin-
dication of the common-agency approach to trade-policy determination, 
yielding plausible results on the forces that shape India's trade policy and on 
the pattern of political organization across tradeable sectors. We explore tra-
de-policy determination in a formulation embodying vertical linkages throu-
gh the use of an input-output matrix, so that all tariffs are determined and 
estimated simultaneously. We also include the effect of duty-drawback sche-
mes whereby exporters recover duties paid on imported intermediate inputs. 
These schemes reduce the incentive to lobby against upstream protection. We 
fi nd that the cross-industry pattern of protection relates to import penetration 
and price elasticities of import demands in the way predicted by the theory, 
and that resistance to upstream protection is to some extent diluted by duty 
drawbacks, although this last effect is not statistically signicant.
The weight on welfare in the government's objective function implied 
by our estimates is 3.09, well below recent estimates ranging between forty 
and three thousand. This number is still implausibly high in that it implies that 
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a lobby should contribute three rupees to the government for each rupee of 
deadweight loss. Given the size of the deadweight losses estimated by empiri-
cal studies of the cost of trade protection (see e.g. Gawande and Krishna's 2003 
survey) this would put the price tag of protection at a prohibitive level. On that 
criterion, however, our estimate appears “closer to the truth” than previous 
ones by a substantial margin. As for the pattern of political organization, we 
fi nd that organized industries include sectors in which India has a comparative 
disadvantage (e.g., machinery), the pattern of protection and lobbying being, 
in some sense, the mirror image of that which prevails in industrial countries.
In the spirit of the political-economy literature, our results are positive 
rather than normative. However they yield two direct policy implications. 
Protection can be expected to go down, in India as elsewhere, only if it becomes 
a less attractive political proposition. Reducing the political attractiveness of 
protection could be achieved in two ways. Either downstream users could be 
encouraged to get organized to lobby against protection in upstream industries 
and possibly even assisted in it. Or, alternatively, existing exemption schemes 
for exporters could be eliminated in order to make political organization more 
attractive for them. Put differently, as a policy tool, duty drawbacks which 
in a traditional analysis would appear to mitigate the inefi ciency effects of 
import protection may end up being counterproductive if they neutralize 
a group of concentrated users who could otherwise constitute a politically 
powerful counterlobbying force.
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Aඉඉൾඇൽංඑ 1
We now calculate the derivatives in (4) term by term. Suppose that a 
duty drawback (DD) scheme is in place whereby import duties paid on inputs 
used by sector j’s fi rms when producing for exports are reimbursed.18 Let λj 
be the share of good j’s production that is exported. As import-competing 
domestic producers align their prices on the tariff-ridden price of imported 
goods, on the cost side it does not matter whether intermediates are imported 
or sourced domestically.19 The unit cost of intermediate good i to user sector 
j is given by
Sector j’s profi ts are
so
Let mi be imports of good i. Aggregate tariff revenue net of du-
ty-drawback refunds is
so in the absence of cross-price eects on either supply or demand sides,
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18. See Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2003) who showed in a similar setting that in equilibrium the 
optimal level of reimbursement is full reimbursement of import duties.
19. Given that only imported intermediates are eligible for the DD, in equilibrium all intermediates 
used in the production of goods for export are imported. This implies a set of constraints of the 
form j λj xij ≤ mi for all i. In our data set these constraints are veried for most sectors except 
where special regimes apply, e.g. for alcohols.
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n
(13)
where                                                                                     is the “net 
price” of good j. Letting y'j stand for                   and noting that
we have
Let 
Substituting this into (13) gives:
Consumer surplus is
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LI | N° 1 | (2013) | ඉඉ. 25-52 | ISSN 0034-8066
n
2
49Eඇൽඈ඀ൾඇඈඎඌ Tൺඋංൿൿඌ ංඇ ൺ Cඈආආඈඇ-A඀ൾඇർඒ Mඈൽൾඅ:A Nൾඐ Eආඉංඋංർൺඅ...
Combining these gives
Noting that
(14)
and
(15)
Adding up (14) and (15), aggregating and letting  αL = nj=1 Ij αj be 
the proportion of the population belonging to organized lobbies gives
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Similar calculations for aggregate welfare give
(16)
Combining these, simplifying and rearranging gives the following FOC:
or, after isolating ti on the LHS and simplifying,
(17)
In order to convert this expression into elasticities, let εi be the 
own-price elasticity of good i’s import demand (in algebraic, not absolute 
value; i.e. εi < 0). In order to limit the demands on data, we will suppose that 
`net-price' supply elasticities are all zero.20 Letting                                  and 
zj = yj/mi, (17) can be converted into elasticities:
(18)
Aඉඉൾඇൽංඑ 2
Let y1 and y2 be two latent (unobserved) random variables corres-
ponding to two regimes of an observed variable y. That is, indexing indivi-
dual observations by i = 1...n,
Let wi be another latent random variable such that
20. Attempts to estimate supply elasticities from the data proved unconvincing.
yi1 if observation belongs to regime 1
yi2 if observation belongs to regime 2
1   if observation belongs to regime 1
0   if observation belongs to regime 2
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and let π be the probability that observation i belongs to regime 1, 
which we assume independent of i; that is,
  π = prob (wi = 1) 
Suppose that y1 and y2 are both normally distributed with means μ1  
and μ2 respectively and with common variance σ and denote their densities 
by f1 and f2 respectively. An example of this setting is a model where where 
ui1 and ui2 are i.i.d. normally distributed white-noise terms and
yi1 = β1 + u1i                                               (19)
yi2 = β1 + β2 + u2i                            (20)
Suppose that β1 > 0 and β2 > 0 in (19)-(20) and let  and be their 
OLS estimates, based on the true sample split. Sort observations so that i = 
1...n1 belong to regime 1 and i = n1 +1 ... n, to regime 2 and let
Let also                be an “average” estimator based on the whole sample. 
Obviously, b is a biased estimator of either β1 or β2. Suppose, without loss of 
generality, that α1 < α2. Obviously,
E (b1) < E (b) < E (b2) .
Then, let           . 
If          0; if                                  . To see this, simply 
observe that if i ≤ n1, E (yi  b) is negative and conversely if  i > n1. Thus, 
residuals from the fi rst regression give a correct classication rule. This obser-
vation carries over to subsequent regressions where observations are classied 
either in regime 1 or in regime 2, by establishing that regime-1 observations 
misclassifi ed in regime 2 will have negative residuals and conversely for 
regime-2 observations misclassifi ed in regime 1. To see this, let
That is,  is the residual when observations are misclassied.
                 , as             if  i ≤ n  and 
conversely if i > n. Thus, residuals are negative for regime-1 observations 
(unorganized sectors) misclassifi ed in regime 2 (organized) and positive for 
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regime-2 observations (organized) misclassifi ed in regime 1 (unorganized). 
It follows that the repeated use of a criterion assigning large residuals to 
regime 2 and small ones to regime 1 yields a valid proxy for the defi nition 
of the classifi cation cutoff.21
Dൺඍൺ Aඉඉൾඇൽංඑ
Tariff data is for the year 1997 and its source is India's WTO notication 
to the Integrated Database System of the WTO. The data comes originally at 
the six digit of the Harmonised System (5112 tariff line). It was converted to 4 
digit of the ISIC classication for manufactures (81 sectors) using a fi lter deve-
loped at the World Bank and which is available from the authors upon request. 
Output and other industry-type data (employment, number of fi rms, etc...) 
are for the years 1993-1995 (average) and its source is UNIDO's Industrial 
database. Because output is measured at domestic prices, whereas imports are 
measured at world prices, in order to construct the import penetration ratio (zj 
), output was divided by (1+tj) before dividing it by imports, so that they are 
both measured at world prices. Trade data is also for the years 1993-1995 and 
its source is United Nation's Comtrade. It comes originally at the six digit level 
of the Harmonized System (HS) and it was fi ltered using the same concordan-
ce as for the tariff data. Import demand elasticities were estimated at the ISIC 
4 digit level for more than 100 countries by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008).
The input-output matrix is for the year 1994 and its source is the so-
cial accounting matrix of GTAP. The GTAP commodity classication differs 
from the ISIC classication, but a concordance exists to the 3 digit of the ISIC 
(available upon request).22 Because our tariff and industry level data is at 
the 4 digit of the ISIC, we infl ate the input-output components of the Social 
accounting matrix assuming that intermediate sales to GTAP category j are 
allocated to ISIC 4 digit sectors in GTAP category i according to output 
shares. The value and the share of intermediate sales in total output for each 
ISIC 4 digit sector is then calculated using this “infl ated” input-output ma-
trix. Capital stocks are calculated using historic data on gross fi xed capital 
formation from UNIDO, using the permanent inventory method and a 10 
percent annual depreciation rate.
21. The proof relies on an approximation, as  is not exactly given by (22) when a regime-1 ob-
servation is misclassifi ed as belonging to regime 2 since the summations will then include the 
wrongly-classifi ed observation. Using the exact formula for the “wrong” estimator complicates 
the notation but does not change the argument.
22. There are fi ve sectors in the GTAP categories that have no correspondance in the ISIC classica-
tion, such as services for example.
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